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1373 
CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON SEIDMAN’S ON 
CONSTITUTIONAL DISOBEDIENCE 
HUGH BAXTER∗ 
At first glance, Louis Michael Seidman’s term “constitutional disobedience” 
is strange. When the U.S. Constitution directs or forbids action, usually it is 
understood to be action on the part of government officials rather than ordinary 
citizens. And those officials take an oath to support the Constitution – an oath 
required by the text of the Constitution itself.1 Seidman’s book, however, is not 
best understood as a manifesto urging government officials to violate their 
oaths and abandon support for the Constitution. 
Is it a call to action on the part of ordinary citizens? Some passages support 
this reading. For example, Seidman suggests in passing that perhaps “all of us 
have a natural duty to share fairly in the arduous but important work of 
undermining constitutional obligation.”2 Here, however, he seems more to be 
tweaking “natural duty” theories of political obligation than speaking seriously 
about our actual duties as citizens. More serious is his suggestion that 
individual citizens participate in a movement of cultural change by responding 
to each “claim that something is unconstitutional . . . with a perfectly 
straightforward, but deeply subversive two-word question: ‘So what?’”3 
Significant cultural change, such as shifts in views about same-sex marriage, 
has happened, Seidman says, in significant part “by ordinary individuals who 
challenge conventional wisdom supporting the status quo.”4 
But here Seidman seeks not so much “constitutional disobedience” from 
ordinary citizens as “constitutional irreverence.” In other passages, Seidman 
seems to seek something much deeper – something like an abandonment of 
constitutional discourse altogether. 
With respect to both citizens and legislators, Seidman calls for a shift away 
from claims that the Constitution requires or forbids certain governmental 
choices and toward more straightforward, “all-things-considered”5 political 
 
∗ Professor of Law and of Philosophy, Boston University. 
1 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 3, cl. 3 (“The Senators and Representatives [of the United 
States], and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial 
Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or 
Affirmation, to support this Constitution . . . .”). 
2 LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, ON CONSTITUTIONAL DISOBEDIENCE 122 (2012).  
3 Id. at 140. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. at 91. 
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debate about “how to solve real, modern problems”6 and “about what will 
produce the best country.”7 By focusing our attention instead on what the 
Constitution requires, permits, and forbids, Seidman contends, constitutional 
discourse has had a “destructive impact.”8 It has, he says, distracted us from 
“the merits” of “the real issues.”9 “[C]onstitutional argument,” Seidman 
claims, “has become a partisan political weapon” that has contributed to our 
“broken” political dialogue.10 
Seidman sometimes presents this development as the working out of an 
inbuilt tendency of constitutional discourse. The idea of self-governance, he 
says, is inconsistent with the idea that constitutional norms can trump the 
people’s present-day “unfettered decisions about the questions that matter most 
to them.”11 Further, Seidman contends, “[w]hen arguments are put in 
constitutional terms, they become absolutist and exclusionary.”12 
Constitutional arguments operate by locating one’s opponents “outside the 
bounds of our community” and in this way they “have poisoned our political 
discourse.”13 The solution: “[O]ur disagreements ought not to be expressed in 
terms of constitutional obligation.”14 
In his preference for open, unfettered political debate over tendencies 
toward judicial supremacy in constitutional interpretation, Seidman is not 
unusual in contemporary progressive legal circles. Many have touted the 
Constitution outside the courts, often looking to social movements as 
interpreters and transformers of constitutional ideals, and in the case of 
Seidman’s friend Mark Tushnet in particular, looking to legislatures as 
constitutional interpreters.15 With Seidman, however, we get the progressive 
 
6 Id. at 59. 
7 Id. at 91. 
8 Id. at 120. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 141. 
11 Id. at 10.  
12 Id. at 141. 
13 Id. at 141-42. 
14 Id. at 142. 
15 MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999); see also, 
e.g., JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION 10 (2011) (“People must be able to 
disagree with, denounce, and protest the Constitution-in-practice, including especially the 
decisions of the courts, and claim the Constitution as their Constitution, so that they can 
help move the Constitution-in-practice toward arrangements that are closer to their ideals.”); 
JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 321 (2011) [hereinafter BALKIN, LIVING 
ORIGINALISM] (“The locus of constitutional change occurs simultaneously in the courts, in 
the political branches, and in the public sphere.”); LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE 
THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 8 (2004) (“Both in its 
origins and for most of our history, American constitutionalism assigned ordinary citizens a 
central and pivotal role in implementing their Constitution. Final interpretive authority 
rested with ‘the people themselves,’ and courts no less than elected representatives were 
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distrust of constitutional courts but not the faith in either social movements or 
legislatures as constitutional interpreters or transformers. In that sense, 
Seidman’s attack on former orthodoxies in constitutional theory is much more 
radical. 
What place does the Constitution have, then, in the wide-open political 
debate that Seidman prefers? Here Seidman seems ambivalent. Sometimes he 
suggests, in common with other progressive constitutional thinkers, that the 
Constitution can provide an organizing frame for political discussion. He 
invokes Tushnet’s idea of the “thin Constitution,” which he understands to 
mean “the ideals articulated in the Constitution’s preamble, in its twin 
promises of liberty and equality, and in the Declaration of Independence.”16 
While these ideals cannot prescribe unique results, Seidman writes, “there is 
nonetheless much to be said for organizing political discourse around these 
ideals.”17 In this mood, Seidman sees the basic values of the thin Constitution 
as providing a “common vocabulary,”18 uniting us as a political community 
while at the same time showing us our differences and that these differences 
are reasonable.19 Seidman aligns this with what he calls “contestation 
theory,”20 under which “resort to foundational principles should be permitted 
only when they preserve the possibility of legitimate contestation.”21 
 
subordinate to their judgments.”); SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: 
WHERE THE CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) 171 
(2006) (“What the Constitution constitutes is what we regard as ordinary politics . . . .”); 
MARK TUSHNET, WHY THE CONSTITUTION MATTERS 17 (2010) (“The constitutional 
provisions that help define our politics, the provisions that matter, can be changed only 
under quite special circumstances – never in litigation, and only once every generation or 
two through politics itself.”); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, 
Departmentalism, and Judicial Supremacy, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1027, 1029 (2004) (“[B]oth 
judicial supremacy and popular constitutionalism each contribute indispensable benefits to 
the American constitutional polity. They are in fact dialectically interconnected and have 
long coexisted.” (footnote omitted)). From across the Atlantic, consider the work of Jürgen 
Habermas. See HUGH BAXTER, HABERMAS: THE DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND 
DEMOCRACY 142-45 (2011) (suggesting connections between Habermas’s work and that of 
recent progressive American constitutional theory).  
16 SEIDMAN, supra note 2, at 135. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 8. 
19 Accord BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 15, at 31 (2011) (“In drafting 
constitutional rights provisions, constitution makers may not do much more than provide a 
constitutional grammar and vocabulary, a set of basic principles and textual commitments, 
and a practice of constitutional argument in which people reason about their rights. That is 
more or less what the American constitutional tradition has produced.”). 
20 See SEIDMAN, supra note 2, at 131. 
21 Id. at 136; see also id. at 142 (suggesting that the Constitution should be seen “as a site 
for contestation, not a source for answers”); id. at 60 (“[C]onstitutionalism is a site for 
struggle and contestation rather than for settlement.”); cf. id. at 8 (“We could all embrace the 
Constitution if we read it as a work of art, designed to evoke a mood or emotion, rather than 
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Yet in other moods, Seidman seems skeptical about even this role for 
constitutional ideals. And even when he is not overtly skeptical, his premises 
suggest that perhaps he should be. In discussing judicial opinions, Seidman 
identifies the open-endedness and hence manipulability of basic values such as 
liberty and equality. He treats judicial talk of basic constitutional values as 
usually just obfuscation, cover for the Justices’ “all-things-considered” 
preferences. But the open-endedness and manipulability of basic values is a 
general problem and not one limited to judicial discourse. Seidman’s 
observation about judicial “values” talk seems no less applicable to ordinary 
political discussion: “It does not require much work to construct an argument 
for or against almost any outcome based on ‘equality’ or ‘liberty.’”22 
Seidman might reply that the problem he identifies arises only if we believe 
in constitutional obligation or obedience. Only then, the argument would go, 
do we believe that these basic values must decide disputes for us by leading us 
to single right answers that bind us, notwithstanding our preferences. But why 
doesn’t all fundamental-values talk polarize and “poison” our political 
discourse, from Seidman’s point of view?23 If I invoke liberty and equality in 
my political argument with you, am I not at least suggesting that you 
misunderstand or don’t care about a value basic to our political community? 
While not accusing you of “treason,” as Seidman suggests that my invocation 
of constitutional obedience “effectively” would amount to, at least my 
fundamental-values argument would seem to locate you “outside the bounds of 
our community.”24 Seidman needs to explain why fundamental-values talk 
poisons and polarizes discourse only when constitutionalized, or at least why it 
is especially dangerous in that form. 
The reply to this objection cannot be that ordinary citizens, or all persons 
not wearing a robe, are better at arguing about fundamental values than judges 
are. Seidman invokes the vexed arguments over abortion’s constitutional 
status,25 but anyone who has tried to have this discussion in fundamental-
values terms, in pretty much any context, has discovered that it more often 
leads either to a shouting match or angry silence than to illumination and 
 
as a legal document commanding specific outcomes.”). Seidman also uses the term 
“contestability theory,” but that term is more commonly associated with economic theory 
than the kind of political theory Seidman seems to have in mind. See id. at 136. 
The idea of the Constitution as site of contestation rather than settlement is a staple of 
recent progressive constitutional theory. See BAXTER, supra note 15, at 222-27 (discussing 
the emergence of constitutional patriotism and its emphasis on constitutions as loci for 
political and moral contestation). 
22 SEIDMAN, supra note 2, at 13. 
23 Id. at 141-42. 
24 Id. at 141. 
25 Id. at 13 (“For example, abortion rights protect the equality and liberty of pregnant 
women, but abortion prohibitions protect the equality and liberty of unborn children. To the 
degree that the results commanded by constitutional values are indeterminate, the obligation 
of constitutional obedience fails to take hold.”). 
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mutual understanding. Seidman is right to note that settlement and consensus 
are not the only goals of political discourse, but he should acknowledge also 
that invocation of basic constitutional values in non-judicial discourse, not just 
in court opinions, seems likely to lead quickly to the polarization and 
demonization he decries. On the penultimate page of the book, Seidman seems 
perhaps to come to this recognition. “More generally,” he writes, “we need to 
stop posturing about fundamental values and begin an open and good faith 
discussion about what will work.”26 
The problem, of course, is that because we do not agree about goals, we 
cannot agree “about what will work.” Seidman would reply that he seeks not 
settlement but contestation. Still, however, that contestation does not seem 
usefully pursued in terms of disagreement over fundamental values. And so, 
even Seidman’s argument for a radically trimmed down constitutionalism – 
that it might provide a “common vocabulary” for productive political 
discussion – does not seem very promising. His position seems to target 
constitutionalism as such, not just the idea of constitutional obedience. 
Seidman might well be happy with this conclusion. In one of the more 
interesting sections of the book, he tries to assess the extent to which, over the 
course of American history, constitutional obedience – judicial enforcement of 
constitutional guarantees against present governmental resistance – has in fact 
protected minority rights and civil liberties. He invokes a whole series of 
historical experiences: the Alien and Sedition Act’s enforcement in lower 
courts; the World War I-era Supreme Court’s approval of the Espionage Act 
and its accommodation of the Palmer raids; the Court’s blessing of World War 
II German saboteurs’ execution “after hasty findings by a military 
commission”; the Court’s refusal to limit McCarthyism “until passions had 
cooled”; the Court’s upholding of Japanese-Americans’ exclusion; and the 
Court’s refusal to invalidate racial segregation until the mid-1950s, “after 
approximately half the country had come to oppose it, and, then, only with a 
symbolic decision that remained almost entirely unenforced” until “southern 
segregationists suffered major defeats at the polls.”27 On the rights-protective 
side of the ledger, Seidman identifies a number of decisions he finds 
unpalatable: constitutional protection for (1) treating slaves as property before 
the Civil War, (2) “commercial and sexually explicit speech,” (3) “the rights of 
white people threatened by affirmative action,” (4) corporate political 
spending, and (5) picketing by “fringe groups” at soldiers’ funerals.28 From 
Seidman’s point of view, the suggestion that these decisions are rights-
protective is ironic. Even if they can be so described, they are not decisions 
Seidman celebrates. True, Seidman also mentions, perhaps with more 
sympathy, the Warren Court’s criminal procedure and school prayer decisions, 
as well as the Court’s recent decisions that have begun to offer support for gay 
 
26 Id. at 142. 
27 Id. at 111-13. 
28 Id. at 113-14. 
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and lesbian rights.29 But he notes retrenchment on the criminal procedure 
decisions,30 and as with the Court’s move against racial segregation, he argues 
that the beginnings of constitutional protection for gays and lesbians have 
come “only after a seismic change in public opinion made the cause 
respectable.”31 
And thus, in sum, constitutionalism – at least the American version, with a 
written constitution that is judicially enforced – does not seem on balance to 
have produced much that Seidman finds worth celebrating. Even the decisions 
whose consequences Seidman approves, such as protection of gay and lesbian 
rights and abortion rights, seem not to go beyond what the median voter would 
approve32 and to be reasoned in language that differs hardly at all from the 
language of ordinary politics.33 
Of course, Seidman’s quick survey of American constitutional history 
cannot settle definitively whether equality rights and civil liberties would have 
been protected at least as well, and with fewer other disadvantages, without a 
written constitution and the practice of judicial supremacy in constitutional 
review.34 His catalog is instructive, but his analysis would have been stronger 
had he considered two points. 
 
29 Id. at 112-13. 
30 Id. at 34. 
31 Id. at 112. 
32 Id. 
33 See id. at 12-13, where Seidman acknowledges that equal protection and due process 
decisions that favor liberal and progressive causes “come[] at the expense of authentic 
obligation” and “are no longer bound by constitutional language in a meaningful sense.” 
Seidman writes specifically of the Supreme Court’s gay-rights opinions, as well as those 
disapproving affirmative-action plans, that they “are at best tenuously tied to the 
constitutional text. Rather than textual exegesis, they reflect some mix of policy judgments, 
interpretations of our traditions, moral determinations, and prudential conclusions. Without 
constitutional obligation, one could easily imagine a court deciding issues like these on 
similar grounds.” Id. at 129. Elsewhere, Seidman writes of the anti-affirmative action 
opinions that they “hardly differ from the kind of policy paper one might expect from a 
think tank or a presidential commission.” Id. at 113-14. This description seems to me even 
more descriptive of the Court’s opinion upholding the University of Michigan Law School’s 
affirmative action admissions plan. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) 
(sanctioning the law school’s use of racial minority status as a “plus” factor in admissions 
decisions, in part because diversity promotes “cross-racial understanding,” enhances 
leadership opportunities, and better prepares the workforce).  
34 Mark Tushnet has called this practice “strong-form” judicial review. By that term he 
means courts’ insistence on having the final and supremely authoritative word on 
constitutionality, notwithstanding legislatures’ reasonable constitutional judgment to the 
contrary. See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND 
SOCIAL WELFARE RIGHTS IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 33-34 (2008) (“Strong-
form review is a system in which judicial interpretations of the Constitution are final and 
unreviewable by ordinary legislative majorities.”). 
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The first concerns Seidman’s insistence that real constitutional obedience – 
the kind that matters to him – can be found only when one would have decided 
otherwise but for the Constitution’s pull.35 Constitutional obedience thus is 
significant and real for Seidman only when it overcomes contrary inclination in 
our ordinary “all things considered” judgments. But what of the possibility that 
those very inclinations are themselves partly shaped by, and to some extent 
reflect, constitutional commitments? Can we separate our political inclinations 
cleanly and entirely from our constitutional tradition? This point seems 
particularly evident in the area of free speech, where ordinary persons likely 
favor protection of some speech whose content they detest, simply because 
protection of a wide range of speech against government suppression is a 
generally accepted norm in American political thinking. In other words, it 
seems likely that some of the inclinations Seidman locates in ordinary all-
things-considered thinking are shaped by our constitutional tradition and its 
norms. And so constitutionalism may have real effects – even effects Seidman 
might approve – outside of “constitutional obedience” as Seidman defines it. 
Second, even if the Court’s protection of rights notably follows majority 
preferences, it might still be significant in imposing more-or-less progressive 
national solutions on “outlier” or “retrograde” states. This pattern is evident in, 
for example, the Court’s recent death penalty decisions that have read the 
Eighth Amendment in light of what it has seen as “evolving standards of 
decency.”36 One sees the same pattern just as clearly in Lawrence v. Texas, 
which looked to an emerging consensus among states, and also among other 
nations, to rule that Texas and a few other states no longer could criminalize 
private, consensual, non-commercial sex between adults.37 This point has been 
made amply in the literature of recent progressive constitutional theory,38 and 
Seidman could have taken it into account. 
 
35 See SEIDMAN, supra note 2, at 13-14 (“[P]eople exercising the power of 
constitutionalism are usually excused from the obligation to provide reasons for why we 
should be bound by constitutional commitments. They need not respond to even the most 
powerful arguments premised on policy and principle for a course of action. Instead, they 
are empowered to say ‘no’ just because of words written on very old parchment.”); id. at 
104 (“[I]t is precisely in those cases where obedience does not advance a particular side’s 
interests that true obedience is tested.”). 
36 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574-75 (2005) (rejecting Missouri’s attempt to 
execute a juvenile offender and deeming prior supportive Supreme Court cases no longer 
controlling); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (relying in part on evolving 
standards in rejecting Virginia’s attempt to execute a defendant with mental disabilities, 
holding that “death is not a suitable punishment for a mentally retarded criminal”). 
37 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
38 See, e.g., Jack Balkin, Roots of the Living Constitution, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1129, 1137 
(2012) (remarking, for example, that “the Warren Court repeatedly exercised judicial review 
to promote liberal political ideas shared by the dominant forces in national political life, 
overturning a series of older doctrines and enforcing liberal interpretations of the 
Constitution against outliers in state and local governments, particularly in the South”); 
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* * * 
Seidman’s Constitutional Disobedience is a well-written and thought-
provoking book about whether American constitutionalism really has the 
positive values commonly attributed to it. I find myself engaged by the lively 
argument but ultimately wondering whether Seidman might romanticize 
ordinary political discussion in somewhat the same way that orthodox 
constitutional theory romanticized the opinions of constitutional courts. 
 
 
David A. Strauss, The Modernizing Mission of Judicial Review, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 859, 
875-87 (2009) (identifying numerous major decisions wherein the Supreme Court 
invalidated state or local statutes as outliers). 
